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ABSTRACT 
This article is concerned with the writings on resistance by Richard Price and Joseph 
Priestley, the leaders of the Rational Dissenters who supported the American and French 
Revolutions, from the late 1760s to 1791. The article discusses the differences between 
Rational Dissent and mainstream (Court) Whig resistance theory, as regards history in 
particular: the Dissenters viewed the Glorious Revolution as a lost opportunity rather than a 
full triumph and claimed the heritage of the Puritan opposition to Charles I, some of them 
justifying the regicide. Price's and Priestley's views on resistance are assessed against the 
benchmark of John Locke's conception of the breach of trust. While both thinkers presented 
themselves as followers of Locke, they departed from his thought by their emphasis on the 
constantly active role of the people. Each in their own way, they also argued that early, 
possibly peaceful, resistance was preferable to violent resistance as a last resort against a 
tyranny. In the end, Price and Priestley articulated each an original theory derived from 
Locke; their views were very close and their main difference concerned the treatment of 
history, Price's caution contrasting with Priestley's justification of tyrannicide. 
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Ever since their own lifetimes, Richard Price (1723–1791) and Joseph Priestley (1733–1804) 
have been recognized as the intellectual luminaries of Dissent in the early reign of George 
III.
1
1 The standard works on Dissent are Michael Watts, The Dissenters, 2 vols (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1978–1995), and James Bennett, History of Dissenters, from the 
Revolution in 1688 to the Year 1808, 4 vols (London, 1808–1812). There are two biographies 
of Richard Price: D.O. Thomas, The Honest Mind: The Thought and Work of Richard Price 
(Oxford: Clarendon, 1977) and Paul Frame, Liberty's Apostle: Richard Price, His Life and 
Times (Cardiff: University of Wales Press, 2015). On Priestley, see Robert Schofield, The 
Enlightenment of Joseph Priestley: A Study of his Life and Work from 1733 to 1773 
(University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1997) and The Enlightened Joseph 
Priestley: A Study of His Life and Work from 1773 to 1804 (University Park: Pennsylvania 
State University Press, 2004).View all notes They were at the vanguard of a group that 
supported the American colonists’ resistance to the mother country, loudly opposed the 
American War and welcomed the French Revolution, at least in its early stages.
2
2 On the 
American War, see James E. Bradley, Religion, Revolution and English Radicalism: 
Nonconformity in Eighteenth-Century Politics and Society (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1990). Bradley discusses Dissenting ministers’ defence of the right of 
resistance during the American War (154–8) and Price's influence over some of them (134). 
On the reception of the French Revolution and the opposition to the French Wars: J.E. 
Cookson, The Friends of Peace. Anti-war Liberalism in England, 1793–1815 (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1982).View all notes The Rational Dissenters were a minority 
within the English Dissenters, which itself accounted for no more than 6% of the English 
population by the late eighteenth century. They were, however, a very vocal group and in 
many ways an advanced intellectual phalanx inside Dissent.
3
3 The Rational Dissenters 
rejected Calvinism and its account of the fall of man and the need for regeneration. They 
embraced Unitarianism (like Priestley at the end of his life) or were on the road to it (like 
Price, an Arian). Knud Haakonssen, ‘Enlightened Dissent: An Introduction’, in Enlightenment 
and Religion: Rational Dissent in Eighteenth-Century Britain, ed. Knud Haakonssen 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 4.View all notes In the broader context of 
the European Enlightenment, or Enlightenments, they are probably the best candidates for a 
British strand of a ‘radical’ enlightenment, one that had connections with the continent and 
that belied interpretations presenting eighteenth-century England as a hegemony of 
conservative forces.
4
4 Jonathan Israel places Richard Price, Joseph Priestley, John Jebb, 
William Godwin and Mary Wollstonecraft within the ‘radical Enlightenment’ in Democratic 
Enlightenment: Philosophy, Revolution, and Human Rights 1750–1790 (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2011). See also Anthony Page, John Jebb and the Enlightenment Origins of 
British Radicalism (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2003).View all notes Rational Dissent is 
significant in the history of resistance because it articulated a new conception of the right of 
resistance that broke away with conceptions that had been current in England since the 
Glorious Revolution of 1688–1689. 
This article examines pamphlets and sermons from 1768, the date of Priestley's first important 
statement on resistance, to 1791. This date corresponds roughly to the end of the early 
reception of the French Revolution (the publication of the first part of Thomas Paine's Rights 
of Man in March 1791 can be considered a turning point), and especially to the waning of 
Price's and Priestley's influence. The first died in April 1791, and the second saw his house 
and scientific apparatus destroyed on 14 July 1791 during the so-called Priestley Riots, a 
tragic episode which led him to emigrate to Pennsylvania in April 1794. From 1768 to 1791, 
Price and Priestley were at the forefront of the Dissenters’ repeated campaigns for the repeal 
of the Test and Corporation Acts. They became notorious and attracted much opprobrium and 
controversy on themselves for defending the American colonists. The two men are still often 
mentioned together given the friendship that united them, the common causes they engaged 
in, and the proximity of their views on the American War, civil liberty, and the separation of 
church and state. Their contemporaries already joined them together, for the same reasons, 
and they themselves had encouraged this coupling when they famously made a show of 
intellectual candour in agreeing to disagree on metaphysical matters.
5
5 Joseph Priestley and 
Richard Price, A Free Discussion of the Doctrines of Materialism, and Philosophical 
Necessity, in a Correspondence between Dr. Price, and Dr. Priestley. To Which Are Added, 
By Dr. Priestley, An Introduction, Explaining the Nature of the Controversy, and Letters to 
Several Writers Who Have Animadverted on his Disquisitions Relating to Matter and Spirit, 
or his Treatise on Necessity (London, 1778).View all notes This article sets out to compare 
Price's and Priestley's conceptions of resistance, which have been studied separately.
6
6 James 
Caudle, ‘Richard Price and the Revolution in Resistance Theory, 1770–1790’, Consortium on 
Revolutionary Europe 1750–1850: Selected Papers (Tallahassee, FL: Institute on Napoleon 
and the French Revolution, Florida State University, 2000), 55–66; Martin Fitzpatrick, 
‘Joseph Priestley, Political Philosopher’, in Joseph Priestley, Scientist, Philosopher, and 
Theologian, ed. Isabel Rivers and David L. Wykes (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 
116–18.View all notes H.T. Dickinson discussed both thinkers in terms of a radicalization of 
Locke's political theory.
7
7 H.T. Dickinson, Liberty and Property: Political Ideology in 
Eighteenth-Century Britain (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1977), 197–9.View all notes 
This point of view is especially relevant as Priestley, and especially Price, claimed they 
followed Locke's principles.
8
8 Richard Price, Political Writings, ed. D.O. Thomas 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 20. On Locke as a major formative 
influence on Priestley (among others, including David Hartley and Isaac Watts), see 
Schofield, The Enlightenment of Joseph Priestley, 1–85.View all notes The following 
discussion will confirm that Price and Priestley went further than Locke, but also show that 
they also departed from Locke each in his different way. In the end, however, they articulated 
converging theories of resistance though they were based on different philosophical premises. 
The analysis will start by general considerations on the Dissenters’ views set in contrast with 
mainstream Whiggism. The following two sections will deal with issues of popular 
sovereignty, the right of resistance and its conditions in the theories of Price, and then 
Priestley. 
1. The dissenters and the mainstream Whig resistance 
theory 
Price's and Priestley's conceptions of resistance must be placed against the backcloth of the 
Whig resistance theory that had been current since the Glorious Revolution. The Rational 
Dissenters departed from this dominant Whig ideology, by their vision of seventeenth-century 
history, secondly, by their defence of popular sovereignty and the people's active role, and 
thirdly by their redefinition of the criteria for legitimate resistance. 
In eighteenth-century Britain, the right of resistance was discussed not just in philosophical 
terms but especially in terms of British history, with precedents from the seventeenth century 
always fresh in memory. Eighteenth-century Britain was a post-revolutionary society in the 
sense that it felt, at least in the dominant whig idiom, that its liberties had been secured 
(however precariously perhaps) after successful resistance to tyranny. There was thus nothing 
seditious in asserting the right of resistance; on the contrary Georgian sermons were expected 
to inculcate sound obedience and a doctrine of limited resistance to tyrants. Most preachers 
taught that tyrants ought to be resisted but good kings must be obeyed, and of course the 
Georges fell in the latter category. ‘The legitimacy of resistance in extremis was part of the 
Court-sanctioned ideology of the first two Georges, as much as the validity of the Glorious 
Revolution and the Act of Settlement which secured it were.’
9
9 James Joseph Caudle, 
‘Measures of Allegiance: Sermon Culture and the Creation of a Public Discourse of 
Obedience and Resistance in Georgian Britain, 1714–1760’ (PhD diss., Yale University, 
1995), 26. See pages 24–40 on the theology of limited resistance as a means of inculcating 
obedience.View all notes While Tories clung to notions of non-resistance and passive 
obedience which ruled out any resistance against the legitimate monarch, all Whigs 
recognized the right of resistance, which was a central plank of the party during the Exclusion 
Crisis and later a justification of the Glorious Revolution. 
John Locke's defence of the right of resistance in the last chapter of the Second Treatise of 
Government (1690) was highly original, conducted as it was in terms of a natural right exerted 
in case of a ‘breach of trust’ by the legislative or the executive. Against tory proponents of 
non-resistance and passive obedience, Locke defended the people's right to active resistance 
‘when the Legislative, or the Prince, either of them act contrary to their Trust’ by acting 
tyrannically and taking away the people's property, or ‘life, liberty, and estate’ which the 
people had entrusted them. Locke listed a number of cases justifying resistance; in particular, 
if the legislative was prevented from assembling or elections were rigged by the executive, if 
the rule of law ceased or the government took away the people's rights, the people were 
released from its obedience, reverted to the original liberty it enjoyed in the right of nature 
and was free to change governors or set up a new polity to defend its property. Though Locke 
stressed the conservative nature of the people, who would bear much oppression before rising 
in revolt, he clearly made them the sole judges and vested in them a right of resistance, but 
also a right to take revolutionary action.
10
10 John Locke, ‘Of the Dissolution of Government’, 
in Two Treatises of Government, ed. Peter Laslett (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1988), 406–28, quotation p.412.View all notes Locke's views were kept alive by the Old 
Whigs (or Commonwealthmen) in the aftermath of the Glorious Revolution and down to 
James Burgh's Political Disquisitions (1774–1776). As for the Court Whigs, they never 
endorsed Locke because of the revolutionary implications of the ‘breach of trust’, especially if 
the people (and potentially the populace or mob) was allowed to take arms to redress 
grievances.
11
11 On the Commonwealthmen: Caroline Robbins, The Eighteenth Century 
Commonwealthman (New York: Atheneum, 1968); J.G.A. Pocock, The Machiavellian 
Moment: Florentine Political Thought and the Atlantic Republican Tradition (Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press, 1975). On the Court Whigs: Dickinson, Liberty and Property, 57–
90, 121–62; Reed Browning, Political and Constitutional Ideas of the Court Whigs (Baton 
Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1982).View all notes The Whigs in power refused 
the doctrine of popular sovereignty and insisted that even though in theory the government 
was conducted on behalf of the people it did not follow that the people should dictate to the 
government, still less resist its rulers. While retaining an abstract right of resistance, they 
played down its practical relevance, insisting that there was no ground for rebelling under the 
mild administration of the Georges and their Whig ministers. The Glorious Revolution was a 
unique historical event; it was justified by James II's tyrannical actions but was the exception 
that proved the rule. Moreover, the Glorious Revolution had led to the final establishment of 
the constitution; liberty and property were protected as fully as humanly possible, which made 
any idea of resistance and rebellion against such a beneficent order all the more 
unjustifiable.
12
12 Dickinson, Liberty and Property, 130–2.View all notes 
The defence of legitimate resistance was tightly knit to that of the Glorious Revolution, hardly 
a revolution at all because, in the Court Whig interpretation, violence was eschewed and the 
Revolution did not involve the lower orders but was conducted mainly by noblemen and 
bishops such as the ‘Seven Immortals’ who invited William of Orange to England. By 
contrast, the ‘Great Rebellion’ of the Puritans against Charles I, and especially the regicide, 
were wicked and condemnable; those episodes could always serve to castigate the Dissenters 
as Edmund Burke memorably did in Reflections on the Revolution in France when he 
compared Price with the Presbyterian divine Hugh Peters, who was praying on the scaffold as 
Charles I was beheaded.
13
13 Edmund Burke, Reflections on the Revolution in France, ed. 
J.G.A. Pocock (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett, 1987), 10. On the conflation between Dissenters, 
republicans and regicides: Stuart Andrews, ‘Cromwell's Ghosts: Republicans and Dissenters’, 
in The British Periodical Press and the French Revolution, 1789-99 (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 
2000), 168–78.View all notes 
The Dissenters adopted different attitudes to seventeenth-century history.
14
14 John Seed, 
Dissenting Histories: Religious Division and the Politics of Memory in Eighteenth-Century 
England (Edinburgh, 2008).View all notes They expressed their own vision in extensive 
historiography and in celebrations such as those of the Glorious Revolution by the Revolution 
Society, founded in London to celebrate the event every 4 November. They did consider the 
Glorious Revolution as the supreme example of successful resistance and cherished its 
constitutional settlement, but they also tended to see it as an unfinished business, criticizing 
the shortcomings of the Toleration Act and the growth of corruption that threatened liberty as 
much as prerogative had before 1688.
15
15 The prime exponent of this interpretation is 
Catharine Macaulay, in The History of England from the Accession of James I to That of the 
Brunswick Line  … , 8 vols (London, 1763–1783) and Observations on a Pamphlet, Entitled, 
Thoughts on the Cause of the Present Discontents (London, 1770). Price expressed similar 
views in A Discourse on the Love of Our Country and in a sermon preached in 1759 (Richard 
Price, ‘Britain's Happiness, and the Proper Improvement of It’, in Political Writings, 1–13. 
Priestley cautioned against the growth of corruption after the Glorious Revolution: Joseph 
Priestley, Lectures on History and General Policy (Birmingham, 1764), 263.View all notes In 
A Discourse on the Love of Our Country, Price complained that the Revolution had left the 
parliamentary representation defective and religious freedom inadequate, as the Test and 
Corporation Acts were still on the statute book. The risk of abuse by the executive was still 
present. The implication was that post-1689 rulers must be watched, and perhaps sometimes 
resisted, though Dissenters took great pains to voice their loyalty to the monarchy.
16
16 H.T. 
Dickinson, The Politics of the People in Eighteenth-Century Britain (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 
1994), 273.View all notes Conversely, they laid claim to the heritage of the patriots who stood 
up to Charles I (parliamentarians like John Pym or John Hampden) while denying any 
responsibility in, and sympathy for, the regicide. In 1769 Priestley put the violence and 
troubles of the Civil War down to Charles I and praised the Dissenters who ‘asserted their 
natural and civil rights’, ‘bravely opposed force to force, justice to injustice, and at length 
prevailed.’ For all that he denied any involvement of the Dissenters in the regicide and 
regretted Cromwell's rule.
17
17 Joseph Priestley, Remarks on Some Paragraphs in the Fourth 
Volume of Dr Blackstone's Commentaries on the Laws of England, Relating to the Dissenters 
(1769), 29–30, quoted in Seed, Dissenting Histories, 125. Blackstone had contended that the 
Dissenters deserved punitive laws because of their turbulent actions in the seventeenth 
century.View all notes At other moments, though, Priestley provocatively accepted the 
regicide. In 1791, defending Price against Burke's aspersions, he distinguished Price from the 
repellent Hugh Peters, but endorsed the regicide, stating that the day of Charles I's execution 
was ‘a proud day for England.’
18
18 Joseph Priestley, Letters to the Right Honourable Edmund 
Burke, Occasioned by his Reflections on the Revolution in France, &c. The third edition, 
Corrected (Birmingham: Thomas Pearson; London: Joseph Johnson, 1791), 12.View all notes 
In 1768, however, Priestley had distanced himself from Cromwell: ‘much more may an 
enemy of Charles the first, be an enemy of Cromwell also.’
19
19 Joseph Priestley, ‘An Essay 
on the First Principles of Government’, in Political Writings, ed. Peter N. Miller (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1993), 7. Some Dissenters harboured underground sympathies 
for Cromwell: Blair Worden, Roundhead Reputations. The English Civil Wars and the 
Passions of Posterity (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 2001), 215–42. Several Dissenting ministers 
praised Cromwell and the Saints: Bradley, Religion, Revolution and English Radicalism, 
146.View all notes Price, on the other hand, was characteristically cautious and he never 
expressed himself on the regicide. The difference between Price and Priestley on the Civil 
War may be one of opinion (Price reproving the regicide and the Commonwealth), or rather, 
quite possibly, one of character (Price was mild-mannered and avoided giving offence while 
Priestley had the reputation of a firebrand and relished controversy). In any case, Price was 
perceived as guilty of regicidal leanings, if only by association, because the Dissenters were 
always suspect of holding back their opinions and hiding a more radical, regicidal-republican 
agenda behind praises of resistance in the Glorious Revolution. 
While the Court Whigs and the Dissenters fundamentally disagreed about English history, 
they shared some common assumptions on the exclusion of the poor from the political 
nation.
20
20 Otherwise, the Dissenters and the Anglicans disagreed over the contours of the 
political nation, if only because the Dissenters campaigned against the Test and Corporation 
Acts, which excluded them from political participation.View all notes By ‘the people’, the 
Court Whigs meant the political nation, enfranchised men, to the exclusion of women and 
men of lower social standing, the ‘populace’ or ‘rabble’. Legitimate resistance was 
undertaken by the ‘people’, not the populace. Part of the gloriousness of the Glorious 
Revolution, as was said, was that it involved little or no participation of the rabble. To avoid 
any misunderstanding, it cannot be said that Price's and Priestley's conceptions of resistance 
were new because their conception of the people would be more ‘democratic’. They probably 
did not envision ‘popular resistance’ as a mass movement involving the uneducated and the 
disenfranchised; that would still belong to the category of the ‘mob’ in their eyes. Price and 
Priestley did wish to widen the boundaries of the political nation by enfranchising new social 
categories, but they did not wish to include servants or manual labourers. Though they were 
leading participants in campaigns for the repeal of the Test and Corporation Acts that 
disenfranchised the Dissenters, they were much more cautious when it came to the poor and 
could not be called democrats in the sense that they did not endorse universal suffrage. They 
did not even discuss women's suffrage. Price, as will be seen below, encouraged popular 
participation (including by resistance to rulers), but he never advocated universal manhood 
suffrage in England, preferring a moderate extension of the franchise.
21
21 D.O. Thomas, 
‘Neither Republican nor Democrat’, Price-Priestley Newsletter 1 (1977): 49–60.View all 
notes Priestley did not share Price's views on popular participation and he thought the 
multitude would remain passive; rather than wishing to enlarge the electorate he proposed a 
literacy test.
22
22 H.T. Dickinson, ‘The Representation of the People in Eighteenth-Century 
Britain’, in Realities of Representation. State Building in Early Modern Europe and European 
America, ed. Maija Jansson (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), 35. Priestley's attitudes to 
the poor were paternalistic and often harsh: Isaac Kramnick, Republicanism and Bourgeois 
Radicalism: Political Ideology in Late Eighteenth-Century England and America (Ithaca, NY: 
Cornell University Press, 1990), 71–98. On the social standing of Rational Dissenters and 
their ambiguous social position as an excluded minority in a position of power and influence: 
John Seed, ‘“A Set of Men Powerful Enough in Many Things”: Rational Dissent and Political 
Opposition in England, 1770–1790’, in Enlightenment and Religion, 140–68.View all notes In 
1769 he argued that it is not necessary for all men to have a voice in elections; ‘it will 
generally be sufficient if the choice of magistrates be in the majority of those whose 
circumstances render them above being corrupted’.
23
23 Priestley, Political Writings, 
134.View all notes Neither Price nor Priestley ever entirely explained who he included in the 
English nation; as for Locke, he was unclear (on purpose, for Richard Ashcraft) as to the 
social conditions for the franchise.
24
24 Richard Ashcraft, Revolutionary Politics and Locke's 
Two Treatises of Government (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1986), 583.View all 
notes Under those conditions, it is not even possible to evaluate whether Price and Priestley 
were more advanced than Locke on that point. 
2. Richard Price and the rejection of the theory of 
resistance in extremis 
Richard Price, a Presbyterian minister in Hackney near London, is mainly remembered today 
for his sermon ‘on the love of our country’, delivered on 4 November 1789, ostensibly to 
celebrate the Glorious Revolution of 1688 but praising the French Revolution as a crowning 
achievement and promise of perpetual peace. In A Discourse on the Love of Our Country, 
Price defined ‘the right to resist power when abused’ as the second of the three principles 
secured by the Glorious Revolution:  
First, the right to liberty of conscience in religious matters. 
Secondly, the right to resist power when abused. 
Thirdly, the right to chuse our own governors, to cashier them for misconduct, and to frame a 
government for ourselves.
25
25 Richard Price, ‘A Discourse on the Love of Our Country’, in 
Political Writings (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 189–90.View all notes 
Price's discourse prompted Edmund Burke to retort in Reflections on the Revolution in 
France, thus igniting the major British controversy around the French Revolution. Burke in 
fact concentrated on Price's third principle, objecting to ‘the right to choose our own 
governors’ (Britain was no elective monarchy), the right to ‘cashier [kings] for misconduct’ as 
if they were mere servants, and the right to ‘frame a government’ in defiance of established, 
traditional forms. Burke was a consistent Whig and as such he cherished the right of 
resistance, reaffirming it as lately as 1788.
26
26 Edmund Burke, who was to be incensed 
against Richard Price and the Dissenters in 1790, defended the American colonists’ resistance 
to British taxation in the early 1770s, and in 1788, during the trial of Warren Hastings, he also 
declared that resistance was necessary against a state that failed in its moral duty to protect the 
people (Richard Bourke, Empire and Revolution. The Political Life of Edmund Burke 
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2015), 678).View all notes 
Burke's criticism of Price's theory and the events in France bear on two aspects of resistance 
theory. First, he denied that the people could dethrone a king for ‘misconduct’ or in case 
power was ‘abused’: the terms were much too weak, and the implication was that Price placed 
the threshold of allowable resistance and revolution much too low. Burke recognized that 
‘[k]ings, in one sense, are undoubtedly the servants of the people because their power has no 
other rational end than that of the general advantage’. It remained that the constitution 
prescribed that subjects must obey the king and not the other way round. The cashiering of 
kings was therefore an ‘extraordinary question of state’. ‘The speculative line of demarcation 
where obedience ought to end and resistance must begin is faint, obscure, and not easily 
definable’, but there must be a series of tyrannical acts (not a single transgression), a number 
of ‘provocations’, and no prospect of improvement to ever justify resistance.
27
27 Burke, 
Reflections, 26–7.View all notes For Burke, then, only resistance in extremis was admissible, 
when the very dissolution of society was threatened, when violence was the only possible 
option and all other solutions had been tried in vain. In this passage, Burke is close to David 
Hume, who explained in his essay ‘On Passive Obedience’, that resistance was permissible in 
extraordinary cases when obedience would provoke the country's ruin. Hume invoked 
Cicero's Stoic maxim salus populi suprema lex, the primary law of self-preservation of the 
state. Such occasions arise ‘in extraordinary cases’ and the only question remains is ‘the 
degree of necessity, which can justify resistance, and render it lawful and commendable’. 
Hume ‘draw[s] the bond of allegiance very close’ and admits the necessity of revolt in 
extreme cases, but never condones tyrannicide – therefore establishing a hierarchy of acts of 
resistance. The question of the threshold of resistance must be left unanswered: it can never 
be ascertained in abstracto and, crucially, it should never be discussed with the general 
public. Commenting on Charles I's death in the History of England, Hume again reserved the 
discussion of the conditions of admissible resistance as arcana imperii: ‘if ever, on any 
occasion, it were laudable to conceal truth from the populace’: commentators must keep a 
‘cautious silence’ for fear of weakening the reverence for the government, whose force is 
founded on opinion.
28
28 David Hume, ‘Of Passive Obedience’, in Political Essays, ed. Knud 
Haakonssen (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 202–3; David Hume, The 
History of England, from the Invasion of Julius Caesar to the Revolution of 1688 
(Indianapolis, IN: Liberty Classics, 1983), 5.544. I have relied on Gilles Robel's critical 
edition of Hume's Essays: David Hume, Essais moraux, politiques et littéraires et autres 
essais (Paris: PUF, 2001), 387–8.View all notes The same features appear in Hume's and 
Burke's accounts of resistance: an admission of the acceptability of resistance in extremis, and 
a reluctance to discussing the conditions of permissible resistance, especially with the 
common people given the danger of agitating such questions. 
Burke proceeded to explain that France's predicament was not so desperate as to justify a 
revolution: Louis XVI's monarchy was tolerable and would be replaced by an intolerable 
revolutionary rule. Secondly, Burke denied Price's contention that the British people had any 
right to change the form of government in the aftermath of a rebellion. A revolution, in his 
eyes, was an extremely rare event meant to oust a tyrant that had broken constitutional rules in 
order to restore them: it had a restorative, conservative purpose. Such was the core meaning of 
the Glorious Revolution for Burke: it was the ideal moment to effect sweeping constitutional 
changes, and that is precisely what the Convention Parliament refused to do.
29
29 Burke, 
Reflections, 15–19.View all notes 
Price's affirmation of the right of resistance, along with the right to refashion institutions (and 
thus disregard tradition) was at its most flamboyant and memorable in 1789, but it was not the 
first exposition of his theory of resistance, which dated back to the American, not the French, 
Revolution. In his best-selling defence of the American colonists in 1776, Observations on the 
Nature of Civil Liberty, provoking a large-scale debate on natural rights in Britain and 
America, Price defended the Americans’ resistance to the coercive policies of the British 
government on the ground that it violated their natural rights.
30
30 Price's pamphlets were 
translated into French, Dutch, German and reviewed in many European periodicals: Yiftah 
Elazar, ‘The Liberty Debate: Richard Price and His Critics on Civil Liberty, Free 
Government, and Democratic Participation’ (PhD diss., Princeton University, 2012).View all 
notes In the 1776 Observations, and in the Additional Observations published the following 
year to answer detractors, Price took up Locke's theory of the government as a trust. This 
served him to assert popular sovereignty and crush the doctrine of the omnipotence of 
parliament that was used by defenders of the North administration to justify coercion in 
America. Parliaments, Price wrote,  
possess no power beyond the limits of the trust for the execution of which they were formed. 
If they contradict this trust, they betray their constituents and dissolve themselves. All 
delegated power must be subordinate and limited. If omnipotence can, with any sense, be 
ascribed to a legislature, it must be lodged where all legislative authority originates; that is, in 
the people.
31
31 Richard Price, ‘Observations on the Nature of Civil Liberty, the Principles of 
Government, and the Justice and Policy of the War with America’, in Political Writings, 28–
9.View all notes 
Civil magistrates, including the king, are the servants, not the masters, of the people, and must 
be held accountable. ‘A king, in particular, is only the first executive officer, the creature of 
the law, and as much accountable and subject to the law as the meanest peasant.’
32
32 Richard 
Price, ‘Additional Observations on the Nature and Value of Civil Liberty, and the Essentials 
of a Free Constitution’, in Political Writings, 88.View all notes Just like Locke, then, Price 
envisioned that the breach of trust could be committed by the legislative or the executive.
33
33 
Locke, ‘Second Treatise’, §221, in Two Treatises of Government, 412.View all notes Another 
parallel can be drawn with Locke's paragraph 221 in the same chapter. Discussing the breach 
of trust committed by the legislative, Locke listed a number of practices of influence and 
‘packing’ that transparently alluded to Charles II and James II.
34
34 Richard Ashcraft, Locke's 
Two Treatises of Government (London: Unwin Hyman, 1987), 214.View all notes Much in 
the same way, Price details a list of actions by Parliament that may be construed as a breach 
of trust, such as the ‘prolonging of its own duration’ (an allusion to the Septennial Act, 1716) 
or the self-election of the House when co-optation gets the better of the popular vote (in the 
notorious Middlesex Election of 1768).
35
35 Price, Political Writings, 28; compare with 
Locke, ‘Second Treatise’, §222, in Two Treatises of Government, 412–14.View all notes The 
drift of Price's argument in those passages from the Observations on Civil Liberty was that a 
partial, venal House of Commons may be worse than no representation at all for it gave a 
delusional semblance of liberty that prevented people from rebelling as they should do if they 
valued liberty properly. 
As Jim Caudle noted, Price's fullest exposition of his theory was in a 33-line footnote to a 
sermon he preached in February 1779.
36
36 Caudle, ‘Richard Price and the Revolution in 
Resistance Theory’, 61–5.View all notes A few weeks before Price had also aired his views in 
similar terms in a letter to Dr William Adams, the master of Pembroke College, criticizing the 
views of Josiah Tucker, who allowed of permissible resistance only in extreme cases of 
oppression.
37
37 Richard Price to Dr William Adams, Monday, 28 December 1778, in The 
Correspondence of Richard Price, gen. ed. W. Bernard Peach and D.O. Thomas (Durham, 
NC: Duke University Press; Cardiff: University of Wales Press, 1983–94), 2.31-33.View all 
notes Price's preaching on a fast day set apart to pray for British success against the 
Americans, was in itself an act of resistance since Price criticized the war and justified the 
Americans.
38
38 Richard Price, A Sermon, Delivered to a Congregation of Protestant 
Dissenters, at Hackney, on the 10th of February Last, being the Day Appointed for a General 
Fast. By Richard Price, D.D. F.R.S. The Second Edition. To Which Are Added, Remarks on a 
Passage in the Bishop of London's Sermon on Ash-Wednesday, 1779 (London, 1779).View all 
notes The sermon rehearsed arguments familiar from the 1776–1777 pamphlets on the 
rejection of divine right monarchy and Tory notions of passive obedience and non-resistance, 
in favour of popular sovereignty, the importance of ‘an equal and virtuous representation of 
the people’ and the accountability of monarchs and parliaments.
39
39 Price, A Sermon (1779), 
20, emphasis in the original.View all notes The significance of Price's theory of resistance in 
this sermon is that it departs from what Caudle calls the theory of ‘resistance in extremis’, 
according to which, in Price's words, ‘resistance can be justified only in cases of extreme 
oppression.’ Such a doctrine, he contends, ‘has lost the world its liberty’, because men have 
tended to act too late (out of ‘indolence’ and lack of union among themselves) so that tyranny 
has had time to build up its repressive arsenal and has become almost unassailable, hence 
much bloodshed which could have been avoided had a tyrannizing monarch been resisted 
earlier. Price turned on its head the traditional notion that resistance must be undertaken as a 
last-resort measure because of its violent, destructive nature. He thus presented resistance to 
early manifestations of tyranny as proactive (not defensive as in resistance in extremis) and 
possibly peaceable.
40
40 Caudle, ‘Richard Price and the Revolution in Resistance Theory’, 
56.View all notes The implication of Price's theory was that peaceful means of resistance 
could be found if employed against ‘low-level’ acts of tyranny, whereas resistance to full-
blown tyranny was bound to be violent and bloody. Price's argument, thus, was that by 
waiting for too long men had encouraged tyrants; rebellions had been bloody while acts of 
resistance could have been less violent and more effectually checked the progress of tyranny. 
Despite his criticism of resistance in extremis, Price was ready to condone armed resistance, 
listing successful examples such as small republics of arms-bearing citizens which 
successfully resisted a mightier monarchy: the Corsicans and France, the Swiss and Austria, 
and especially the United Provinces, which were born out of successful armed resistance 
against Spain.
41
41 Price, Political Writings, 65–6.View all notes Price did not refrain from 
calling to armed resistance, or at least praising it. ‘Freemen will always revolt at the sight of a 
naked sword’, he wrote in Observations on Civil Liberty, in a transparent allusion to 
American rebellion against British soldiery.
42
42 Price, Political Writings, 55. In his private 
letters, Price encouraged his American correspondents to resist the British parliament in more 
understated ways, possibly because he knew that his mail was monitored by the government. 
See, for instance, Richard Price to Ezra Stiles, 2 November 1773, in Correspondence of 
Richard Price, 1.166.View all notes 
Not only did Price approve of rebellions past and present, when undertaken on behalf of 
liberty against authoritarian power, he also wished men had sometimes revolted sooner. He 
wrote to William Adams that ‘a people ought always to keep a jealous eye over the men to 
whom they have committed the trust of government, and to resist as soon as they think 
oppression is beginning.’ The sermon articulates the same view:  
[t]he truth is, that oppression cannot be resisted too soon; and that all the tendencies to it 
ought to be watched. Had this been always done, tyranny would have been crushed in its 
birth; and mankind would have been always happy.
43
43 Price, A Sermon (1779), 19, emphasis 
in the original.View all notes 
Price's optimism appears wildly exaggerated here. However naïve Price might sound, the 
salient point is that resistance is a prudential duty that starts ‘as soon as [the people] think 
oppression is beginning.’ He articulates a duty of resistance, as it were, going well beyond the 
right of resistance that all Whigs acknowledged. This kind of civic resistance is tied to the 
notion that the patriot must actively participate in the affairs of the community, exert vigilance 
over magistrates and criticize them when needed. Price consistently listed those duties among 
the major characteristics of the patriot, in the 1779 sermon, but also in the 1776 Observations 
and in the 1789 Discourse on the Love of Our Country, where he wrote: ‘the tendency of 
every government is to despotism, and in this the best constituted governments must end, if 
the people are not vigilant, ready to take alarms, and determined to resist abuses as soon as 
they begin.’
44
44 Price, A Sermon (1779), 19–21. A similar description of the patriot is made in 
1776 (Price, Political Writings, 30); Price, ‘A Discourse on the Love of Our Country’, in 
Political Writings, 187.View all notes Such wishes for a vigilant citizenry hark back to the 
Country defiance of the men at court; in this Price may well be ranked among the last 
representatives of the republican, Machiavellian ideology of the Commonwealthmen.
45
45 
Robbins, Eighteenth Century Commonwealthman, 334–45.View all notes 
Price's call for early resistance – and probably, then, for more frequent acts of resistance – 
departs from Locke's insistence on the exceptional character of rebellions following a breach 
of trust. Locke justified resistance and the people's right to overthrow the government but 
immediately added that the doctrine did not open the door to sedition because the people 
would bear much oppression before they started to revolt.  
Such revolutions happen not upon every little mismanagement in public affairs. Great 
mistakes in the ruling part, many wrong and inconvenient laws, and all the slips of human 
frailty, will be born by the people without mutiny or murmur.
46
46 Locke, ‘Second Treatise’, 
§225, in Two Treatises of Government, 415.View all notes 
The emphasis in Price is markedly different because he acknowledges the long patience of the 
people only to deplore it, and he insists that in most cases the people ought to have resisted 
earlier, ‘as soon as they think oppression is beginning’. However, acts of early resistance such 
as disobeying orders and standing one's ground are a far cry from rebellion and civil war. 
Subjects in Locke appear to be passively tied by the contract and can change an oppressive 
government only by way of a revolution. In Price's ideal polity, by contrast, the citizens are 
bound to obey the law, but have a moral duty of defending their own liberties, which entailed 
criticizing the magistrates and resisting them if they perceived tyrannical intentions. 
Before moving on to examine Joseph Priestley, it is fitting to recapitulate the features of 
Price's theory, and an internal tension that they entail, which also affects Priestley's. Price 
went further than Locke by allowing more agency to the ‘people’ (admittedly, still limited to 
the enfranchised part of the population), by encouraging a constant popular monitoring of the 
king, ministers and parliament, and especially by lowering the threshold of resistance, arguing 
that resistance ought to begin as soon as the people perceive a drift toward despotism. Such a 
conception would perhaps make resistance more frequent and more commonplace, if 
government actions routinely trigger acts of resistance. It is arguable that Price's appeal to 
constant civic vigilance and surveillance of acts that may tend to tyranny can verge on 
paranoia. Jim Caudle offers a more positive interpretation, speculating that Price ‘had 
redefined resistance into reformism’ because coordinated ‘popular’ resistance (by the political 
nation, through the channels of parliamentary representation or petitions to the king) could 
replace bloody resistance. In this view Price's theory of early resistance justifies parliamentary 
reformism and points the way toward modern constitutions ‘which involved paper ballots 
rather than lead musket shots.’
47
47 Caudle, ‘Richard Price and the Revolution in Resistance 
Theory’, 65.View all notes This is a seductive view, but its rather teleological optimism is 
belied by Price's continued insistence on the recourse to arms. In Observations on Civil 
Liberty he opposes the valiant, arms-bearing Americans to the slavish Britons; in 1779 he 
presented the ‘musket’ as an essential part of the freeman's furniture:  
There is a distant country, once united to us, where every inhabitant has in his house (as a part 
of his furniture) a book on law and government, to enable him to understand his civil rights, a 
musket to enable him to defend these rights, and a Bible to enable him to understand and 
practice his religion.
48
48 Price, A Sermon (1779), 26. For the idealization of the citizen-soldier 
in Observations on Civil Liberty, see Price, Political Writings, 123.View all notes 
Armed resistance can never be ruled out in order ‘to defend [civil] rights’. The idealized 
figure bearing lawbook, musket and Bible is more reminiscent of Country ideology than 
anticipating modern constitutions (unless we consider the Americans as ancient and the 
British as irrecoverably modern). It suggests that citizens of a healthy, liberty-loving republic 
must hold civil magistrates to account, and a necessary consequence is the possibility of 
armed resistance, which in turn presupposes an arms-bearing, well-trained citizenry. 
Political participation and resistance, at least under the form of a threat, are inescapably bound 
together in Price's doctrine, which therefore possesses the two somewhat contradictory 
elements that Martin Fitzpatrick identified in a discussion of Priestley's views on resistance: a 
‘concern for reform and inclusion’ through the translation of popular sovereignty into voting 
rights and popular participation, and on the other hand the ‘reassertion of the right to resist 
those in power’.
49
49 Fitzpatrick, ‘Joseph Priestley, Political Philosopher’, 116.View all notes 
Price's doctrine is more liable to this contradiction than Priestley's, since it affirms both 
popular participation and resistance strongly, while Priestley insists on the latter, but not so 
much on the former, element. 
3. Joseph Priestley, between Lockean resistance and 
utilitarian calculus 
Like Price, Priestley held his doctrine of resistance consistently before and during the French 
Revolution. His laid out his opinions in his Lectures on History and General Policy (which 
originated in his lectures at the Warrington dissenting academy in the mid-1760s), and more 
fully in his 1768 Essay on Government.
50
50 Joseph Priestley, Lectures on History and 
General Policy (Birmingham, 1764).View all notes Just like Price, Priestley was elated by the 
French Revolution and was confident it ushered in a period of universal peace, as he wrote in 
Letters to the Honourable Edmund Burke, a refutation of Reflections on the Revolution in 
France written within two months after the publication of Burke's book.
51
51 Schofield, The 
Enlightened Joseph Priestley, 279, 281; Priestley, Letters to the Right Honourable Edmund 
Burke: see 1–33 especially on resistance and Price's interpretation of the Glorious 
Revolution.View all notes In the Letters, Priestley defended Price and his interpretation of the 
Glorious Revolution, and restated his own views on resistance. The Lectures on History and 
General Policy were republished in 1793, without any change on the subject of resistance,
52
52 
Joseph Priestley, Lectures on History, and General Policy; To Which Is Prefixed, An Essay on 
a Course of Liberal Education for Civil and Active Life … . In Two Volumes (London: Joseph 
Johnson, 1793).View all notes which suggests a continuity of views until at least a few 
months before Priestley's exile to America. 
Priestley's political theory is very different from Price's but he affirms the right of resistance 
as forcefully, and somewhat more rhetorically, than Price did. He also departs from Locke and 
resistance in extremis in his own way. In the Essay on the First Principles of Government, he 
distinguished political liberty (participation in legislation and government) and civil liberty, 
while Price confounds the two. For Priestley, the majority of the people are indifferent to 
politics, and so political liberty matters little, far less than does civil liberty, understood 
negatively as the right to carry on one's own private affairs unmolested by the state. Priestley's 
doctrine is utilitarian and relatively indifferent to citizenship as understood (as Price did) as 
active, constant political participation. For Priestley, the role of the government is to provide 
for the happiness of the people. ‘The good and happiness of the members, that is the majority 
of the members of the state, is the great standard by which every thing relating to that state 
must finally be determined.’ Political representation matters little provided the government 
meets this end.
53
53 Joseph Priestley, ‘An Essay on the First Principles of Government’, in 
Political Writings, 1–128, quotation p.13. The quotation is the closest equivalent in Priestley 
of the formula ‘the greatest happiness of the greatest number’. On Jeremy Bentham's possible 
debt to Priestley, see Robert Shackleton, ‘The Greatest Happiness of the Greatest Number: 
The History of Bentham's Phrase’, Studies in Voltaire and the Eighteenth Century 90 (1972): 
1461–82.View all notes 
In the 1768 Essay, Priestley devoted several pages to the right of resistance. His main 
statement on the subject takes the form of a passionate rhetorical period:  
if the abuses of government should, at any time be great and manifest; if the servants of the 
people, forgetting their masters, and their masters’ interest, should pursue a separate one of 
their own; if, instead of considering that they are made for the people, they should consider 
the people as made for them; if the oppressions and violations of right should be great, 
flagrant, and universally resented; if the tyrannical governors should have no friends but a few 
sycophants, who had long preyed upon the vitals of their fellow citizens, and who might be 
expected to desert a government, whenever their interests should be detached from it: if, in 
consequence of these circumstances, it should become manifest, that the risque, which would 
be run in attempting a revolution would be trifling, and the evils which might be apprehended 
from it, were far less than those which were actually suffered, and which were daily 
increasing; in the name of God, I ask, what principles are those, which ought to restrain an 
injured and insulted people from asserting their natural rights, and from changing, or even 
punishing their governors, that is their servants, who had abused their trust; or from altering 
the whole form of their government, if it appeared to be of a structure so liable to abuse?
54
54 
Priestley, Political Writings, 18. The sentence is also quoted in Fitzpatrick, ‘Joseph Priestley, 
Political Philosopher’, 116 and in Dickinson, Liberty and Property, 197–8.View all notes 
While recognizing ‘a difference of emphasis as well as of tone’, Martin Fitzpatrick judges that 
this passage ‘represents a radicalization of Locke rather than a departure from his 
thinking’.
55
55 Fitzpatrick, ‘Joseph Priestley, Political Philosopher’, 116.View all notes 
Indeed, Priestley uses the Lockean phraseology of ‘abuses’ and remains, seemingly at least, 
within the theory of resistance in extremis, justifiable if the government is ‘tyrannical’ and ‘if 
the oppressions and violations of right should be great, flagrant, and universally resented’. At 
the end, the expression ‘abused their trust’ is borrowed from Locke but it doesn't follow that 
the structure of the argument was Lockean in the 1768 Essay.
56
56 In 1791, however, Priestley 
quoted Locke, discussed a tacit ‘original compact’ and insisted like Locke that the people was 
naturally conservative and would bear much oppression before revolting (Priestley, Letters to 
the Right Honourable Edmund Burke, 7–8).View all notes Indeed Priestley did not resort to 
the fiction of a social contract because his utilitarian premises made it redundant. In The 
Present State of Liberty in Great Britain and Her Colonies (1769) Priestley bypassed the 
notions of trust and compact and simply wrote that ‘nothing hinders that people, thus grossly 
abused and insulted by their magistrates […] should strip them of their power, and confer it 
where they have reason to hope it will be less abused.’
57
57 Priestley, Political Writings, 134–
5.View all notes 
To return to the above-mentioned passage from the Essay, the Lockean breach of trust is at 
odds with quite a different idea, that of a quantification of good and evil accruing from 
revolution. If the risk is trifling and involves less evil than those suffered under tyranny, then 
revolution is worthwhile. This results directly from Priestley's consequentialist ethics and the 
principle of the greatest happiness of the greatest number: revolution is possible and desirable 
provided it is not too costly. In theory, theory, then, governments might be toppled even if 
they are not tyrannical. This utilitarian calculation, therefore, opens a breach in the doctrine of 
resistance in extremis. A change in government appears as an experiment that may be worth 
making. Priestley never asserted that resistance to an unsatisfying, though untyrannical, 
government was both desirable and possible. He was probably cautious and insisted that 
revolutions were desperate measures taken by an oppressed people (this argument served to 
justify the French Revolution and ascribe the guilt for the bloodshed to Louis XVI and his 
minions).
58
58 Priestley, Political Writings, 8, 20.View all notes Although Priestley was 
careful to stress revolutions were caused by longstanding, unbearable oppression, he also 
imagined that France could change its political regime frequently in the wake of its 
revolution. He did not flinch at the idea of recurrent regime change following revolutions, 
considering this less as a tragedy or human drama than as an interesting scientific experiment. 
Like all oppressed people, he argued, the French would probably fail to see beyond their more 
direct grievances and the constitutional settlement deriving from their revolution would 
probably fail to redress all problems. But  
if the people in general be well informed and well disposed, they may make many 
experiments of new forms of government without much inconvenience; and though beginning 
with a very imperfect one, they may adopt a very good one at the last.
59
59 Priestley, Political 
Writings, 8.View all notes 
Priestley is vague and optimistic in this evocation of a string of ‘experiments of new forms of 
government without much inconvenience’ without ever considering that the transitions could 
be painful.
60
60 The new American states born of the American Revolution are ‘so many new 
experiments, of which political philosophers cannot fail to make the greatest use’ (Joseph 
Priestley, Lectures on History and General Policy, to Which Is Prefixed an Essay on a Course 
of Liberal Education for Civil and Active Life (Birmingham, 1788), 14, emphasis in the 
original).View all notes This judgment, in retrospect, appears almost flippant knowing that 
France was to undergo other revolutions and run the whole gamut of régime types until 
stabilizing as a republic in the 1870s. 
Perhaps the best illustration of this tendency of Priestley's style of reasoning is a paper read to 
the Manchester Literary and Philosophical Society in 1787 by Thomas Cooper, a personal 
friend of Priestley's who defended radical opinions forcefully during the French 
Revolution.
61
61 Thomas Cooper (1759–1839) gained his radical credentials and his notoriety 
by writings on parliamentary reform, and especially his travel to Paris with James Watt, Jr., in 
the Spring of 1792, where he visited the Jacobin Club. Cooper knew Priestley and emigrated 
to the United States at the same moment in April 1794. On Cooper: Schofield, The 
Enlightened Joseph Priestley, 322, 329, 333–4; Stephen L. Newman, ‘Cooper, Thomas 
(1759–1839)’, Oxford Dictionary of National Biography, Oxford University Press, 2004; 
online edn, October 2006, http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/6231.View all notes 
Cooper argued much along Priestley's lines. The end of government is the promotion of the 
happiness of the majority; governors are only given a delegation of power based on the 
consent of the governed. ‘The governors of whatever description in every society upon earth 
are accountable to the governed.’
62
62 Thomas Cooper, ‘Propositions Respecting the 
Foundation of Civil Government’, Memoirs of the Manchester Literary and Philosophical 
Society, 1st series, 3.481-509, quotation p.500. The paper was read on 7 March 1787.View all 
notes The people have a right to resist any encroachment of despotism, but they are not only 
reactive. They also have an inalienable right to alter the government or change its rulers 
whenever they think fit (even without provocation). Cooper was ready to endorse not just the 
Glorious Revolution but, as Priestley did in some writings, the Civil War of the 1640s. His 
utilitarian approach conducts him to weigh the sufferings of the revolutionary generation with 
the benefits of later generations; hence he concludes on the ‘benefit of the exertions of the 
people under the tyrants John, Charles, and James even at this day: the evils of those exertions 
were confined to a generation or two.’
63
63 Ibid., 507–9, quotation p.509.View all notes In 
Cooper's version, Priestley's theory of revolutions led to an acceptance of sufferings for ‘a 
generation or two’ in the name of the people's liberation; as this 1787 memoir testifies, men 
like Cooper and Priestley were disposed to welcome the French Revolution with optimism, 
even if there should be bloodshed in the process. 
4. Conclusion 
Both Price and Priestley were self-professed disciples of Locke and employed his vocabulary. 
Both, however, departed from him. The constant vigilance that Price praises as a patriotic 
duty contrasts with the passive stance that the people appear to adopt in Locke's account, 
where the people are roused into action only under extreme circumstances. Both Price and 
Priestley recognize the passivity of the people stated by Locke, but only to deplore it and try 
to goad the people out of it with their pamphlets. In Locke, it is unclear whether the people, 
after they have resumed power as a consequence of a breach of trust, will change the 
governors or the form of government itself. It appears clear that they have a right to do so, 
since they are sovereign and free to entrust the power in any way they wish. Price and 
Priestley are more forthright and clearly state that the people may topple a government, 
punish the governors and remodel the form of government. The idea of régime change, or 
major constitutional overhaul appalled Burke. Price stated that we the Britons (and any 
people) had a right to ‘frame our government for ourselves’;
64
64 Price, Political Writings, 
190.View all notes the historical possibility was always open. Priestley followed Price on this 
point. Both were elated by the idea that successful revolution had toppled the French 
monarchy and they expected other tyrannical governments to follow the same course and be 
replaced with free polities. It is unclear whether they wished to set up a republican régime in 
Britain and other European countries. Both Price and Priestley protested that they were loyal 
to the Hanoverian monarchy and repudiated the idea of a republic in Britain. If they were not 
republicans in the sense that did not advocate a non-monarchical government, their thought 
bore some of the features of the classical republican tradition, especially in the case of Price 
who emphasized the duty of political participation of an arms-bearing citizenry (much more 
strongly than Priestley did).
65
65 D.O. Thomas, ‘Neither Republican nor Democrat’; 
Fitzpatrick, ‘Joseph Priestley, Political Philosopher’, 138–9.View all notes Both men admired 
the American republican experiment in liberty, Price enthusing as early as 1778 on ‘a rising 
empire, extended over an immense continent, without bishops, without nobles, and without 
kings’
66
66 Price, ‘Introduction to Two Tracts’, in Political Writings, 19.View all notes Price's 
and Priestley's repeated protestations of loyalty to the monarchy may well be defensive and 
meant to hide a republican agenda; but they might just as well signal a dissociation of the Old 
and New worlds in their hopes and commitments: a realization that America was free to 
experiment and republicanism, while old European countries, including Britain, were held 
back by monarchical and aristocratic mentalities and traditions and could not be expected to 
transform into republics overnight. 
Price and Priestley, therefore, hold quite similar views on resistance. There remain some 
differences, though some oppositions can be resolved. In particular, Price defended early 
resistance against the theory of resistance in extremis. On the other hand, Priestley seems to 
adopt this very theory when he repeated that resistance would only take place as a last resort 
against despotism. Yet he also argued in terms of utility and the implication of his cost–
benefit analysis is that early resistance might well be advantageous in some cases. It is unclear 
to what extent Priestley is a real Lockean, since Locke's conceptual framework of rights, trust 
and contract is unnecessary in Priestley's utilitarian construction of the polity. Priestley's 
utilitarianism leads him to a defence of gradual resistance that is congruent with Price's: the 
people remonstrate to their representatives, or through their representatives to the supreme 
magistrate, and resistance escalates in case complaints are ignored, until a full-blown 
revolution breaks out.
67
67 Priestley, Political Writings, 134–5.View all notes Price's emphasis 
on that issue of early resistance to creeping tyranny is different because he is more ready to 
acknowledge the necessity of armed resistance, rather than just action through political and 
constitutional channels as in Priestley. 
The main difference between the two thinkers touches the justification of violence and 
tyrannicide. Priestley did not hesitate to justify tyrannicide as ‘the generous attack of the 
noble and daring patriot’. The tyrant will be sure to call a missed attempt ‘rebellion’ but ‘that 
censure cannot make the thing itself less glorious’.
68
68 Priestley, Political Writings, 23.View 
all notes Priestley went on to praise Harmodius and Aristogiton, the killers of the Athenian 
tyrant Hipparchus, and Algernon Sidney and Lord William Russell, who were executed 
following the Rye House Plot against Charles II in 1683.
69
69 Priestley, Political Writings, 23. 
On the rich tradition of writings on tyrannicides: Mario Turchetti, Tyrannie et tyrannicide de 
l'Antiquité à nos jours (Paris: Presses universitaires de France, 2001).View all notes Price, on 
the other hand, wrote of the ‘right […] to cashier’ our governors.
70
70 Price, Political 
Writings, 192.View all notes The word ‘cashier’ hides the violence of the punishment, except 
if Price had in mind a bloodless transaction if which a king has his life spared. Price elided the 
tyrannicide altogether in his writings, though there was no doubt that a sovereign people in a 
position of punishing a king had both the right and the possibility to execute him. Price might 
have had sympathies for the figure of the tyrannicide though he never put it in writing. He 
was a dominant figure in the Society for Constitutional Information and the Revolution 
Society. At one meeting of the first society in 1782, a song was sung to Harmodius and 
Aristogiton. In 1788, for the centenary of the Glorious Revolution, the Revolution Society 
drank a toast to ‘the immortal memory of Hampden, Pym, Russell, and Sydney’, linking up 
Charles's parliamentary opponents and the republican martyrs Russell and Sidney.
71
71 Sir 
William Jones, An Ode, in Imitation of Callistratus, Sung by Mr. Webb, at the Shakespeare 
Tavern, on Tuesday the 14th day of May, 1782, at the Anniversary Dinner of the Society for 
Constitutional Information ([London], [1782]); November, 1788. On the 4th of This Month, 
Which Was the Hundredth Anniversary of the Glorious Revolution in 1688  … ([London], 
[1788]).View all notes There is no saying whether or not Price secretly shared Priestley's 
admiration for tyrannicides. On this point, it is quite possible that Priestley wrote what Price 
did not dare to say.
72
72 Priestley, Political Writings, 134–5.View all notes 
It remains the case that their writings represent the moment when Rational Dissenters most 
fully expressed a bold doctrine of the right of resistance. It is impossible to sum up in a few 
words the destiny of Dissent after 1791, when governmental repression and loyalist 
harassment combined to silence those supporting reform at home or the French Revolution 
abroad. The period that followed was certainly one of retreat, as far as Dissent was concerned. 
William Godwin, who stemmed from Rational Dissent and was educated in a dissenting 
academy, stole the limelight with Political Justice in 1793. Considering that all true change 
came from the power of truth, he stated that only rational discussion could enlighten men and 
effect political and social reformations. Godwin therefore rejected violence as a method of 
political improvement and ‘provide[d] us with an account of non-violent change and 
transition which is in many ways more conservative than Locke in its implications for the 
justification of violent political action.’
73
73 Mark Philp, Godwin's Political Justice (Ithaca, 
NY: Cornell University Press, 1986), 77.View all notes Price and Priestley were rather bolder 
than Locke; they brought resistance to the fore and supported resistance in America and in 
France, though they never called for armed resistance in Britain. Their writings from 1768–
1776 and 1789–1791 provided inspiration for new groups sprung in 1792, especially the 
London Corresponding Society, which affirmed squarely the people's ‘natural and unalienable 
rights of RESISTANCE TO OPPRESSION, and of SHARING THE GOVERNMENT OF 
THEIR COUNTRY’.
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